Abstract-Anomaly-detection techniques have considerable promise for two difficult and critical problems in information security and intrusion detection: detecting novel attacks, and detecting masqueraders. One of the best-known anomaly detectors used in intrusion detection is stide. (Rather than STIDE or Stide or s-tide, we have chosen "stide" in keeping with the way the detector was referred to in the recent and frequently cited paper by Warrender et al., 1999.) Developed at the University of New Mexico, stide aims to detect attacks that exploit processes that run with root privileges. The original work on stide presented empirical results indicating that data sequences of length six and above were required for effective intrusion detection. This observation has given rise to the long-standing question, "Why six?" accompanied by related questions regarding the conditions under which six may (not) be appropriate. This paper addresses the "Why six" issue by presenting an evaluation framework for mapping out stide's effective operating space and by identifying conditions that contribute to detection capability, particularly detection blindness. A theoretical justification explains the effectiveness of sequence lengths of six and above, as well as the consequences of using other values. In addition, results of an investigation are presented, comparing stide's anomaly-detection capabilities with those of a competing detector.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N A SOLID BODY of work inspired by the way that natural immune systems distinguish self from other, Forrest and her colleagues at the University of New Mexico presented and analyzed the effectiveness of a detection scheme aimed at enhancing the security of computer systems [1] - [3] . They saw computer-system security as an instance of the more general problem of distinguishing self, e.g., the normal behavior of system programs, from other. A good example is the behavior of a trojanized system program (other) as opposed to the behavior of the same system program, but uncompromised (self).
Out of the efforts in computer immunology, evolved the detector that is now called sequence time-delay embedding (stide) [13] . Stide's predecessor, the original self/other detector, was initially presented as a change-detection algorithm for detecting computer viruses [1] , [2] . Stide has been applied to the task of detecting intrusions or exploits by way of detecting abnormal behavior in processes that run with root privileges on Unix systems. Stide operates on categorical data in the form of system kernel calls issued to the kernel of the host system by the running process. The reference to "time" in the name of the detector reflects the time-series nature of the categorical data upon which the detector was deployed. Throughout the series of papers that have documented the many experiments aimed at studying the effectiveness of stide with respect to the detection of exploits and intrusions in Unix systems, the one curiosity that has been most conspicuous due to its significant impact on the performance of the detector, has been the question of the "best" or most appropriate detector-window length or sequence length (used interchangeably) required in any application of the algorithm. For stide, this value is set a priori, and used to determine the length of all the sequences obtained from both training and test data. In the literature, we find that a sequence length of six is referred to consistently, with regard to stide, by independent investigators [10] , [5] as well as in experiments performed by the authors of the detector. For example, although a sequence length of ten was finally settled on, in the results for the experiments in [4] , it was observed that a sequence length of at least six appeared to be necessary in order to detect anomalies in all the intrusive data presented to the detector. Such an observation naturally prompts questions regarding the appropriate value of the detector-window parameter for stide, a problem that is not at all foreign to the community [5] ; for example:
• why does a detector-window length of six appear to work, while lengths less than six do not? • is a detector-window length of six appropriate for all data from differing environments? • what is the impact on detection accuracy if an "incorrect" detector-window length is used? • if not by "ad hoc means" [5] , how else can the "best" detector-window length be determined? That the value of the sequence-length parameter impacts the performance of the detector has not only been noted by the original authors, but also in subsequent, independent work [4] - [6] , [10] . Marceau [6] , noting stide's reliance on a "magic number," suggested a way of obviating the need for a priori selection of a fixed window length. She did not, however, address the issues of why or how fixed lengths of certain sizes affect stide's performance (nor was it her goal to do so). Lee and Xiang [5] proposed an information theoretic solution to the problem of choosing the optimal detector-window length for probabilistic anomaly detectors. We address their approach in Section V.
The question of the appropriate detector-window length may have implications for aspects of detection other than performance. In particular, we were interested to know whether 0733-8716/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE the results obtained by the original investigators represent a serendipitous match between the particular data sets used and the detector-window length. In other words, is six a necessary parameter value for this kind of detector, or simply sufficient for the data at hand? Answering questions of this nature is essential if we wish to avoid deploying detectors of this kind (anomaly detectors in general, not just stide) in environments where they may fail or be grossly ineffective.
Presenting a solution to the "Why six" issue may seem to beg the corresponding question of what good it is to know this result. The work in this paper goes beyond solving a single vexing mystery. It casts a broader methodological net, enabling a principled selection of operating parameters, exposing detector weaknesses, providing credible evidence to support claims of efficacy, and supplying a process that can be extended to determine the operational effectiveness of other detectors.
That a detector has its weaknesses is not the issue being raised in this paper; any detector can have weaknesses. The issue is to know precisely, and to identify clearly, what a detector's strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities are, so that the knowledge becomes operationally useful in such a way that a detector can be deployed with confidence in environments where it will be most effective and least vulnerable to compromise. That, and the solution to the "Why six" problem, are the main contributions of this work.
II. PROBLEM, APPROACH, AND HYPOTHESIS
A long-standing issue with stide has been one of understanding why the number six is the "magic number" that makes stide work. People tend to dislike and distrust magic numbers, because they do not know how they are determined, and because they are not assured that for their situation the same magic number will produce the desired results. For example, Stillerman et al. [10, pp. 68] said, "We originally used a sliding window of length six, and later experimented with shorter window lengths. Somewhat to our surprise, a window length of two was just as good as a window length of six in detecting attacks." Their paper did not attempt an explanation.
The problem addressed in this paper is that of determining why six is the magic number that makes stide work. In addition, we take on the issue of what happens if that magic number is not set correctly in stide. Our approach is to establish a framework of sequence types (rare, common, and foreign), and within this framework to show how a very specific kind of anomaly, namely a minimal foreign sequence (defined in Section VI), affects the detection capabilities of stide. Our hypothesis is this: a detector window of at least six was required to detect anomalies in all intrusive traces in the Hofmeyr et al. [4] dataset because the length of the smallest minimal foreign sequence present in one of the intrusive traces was six. An experiment was conducted to validate the hypothesis.
We begin by describing stide and by replicating the essential finding of stide's creators -that six is the magic number. Through doing this, we establish the experimental foundation for drawing conclusions on the same basis as did the original authors of stide. We then address the idea, suggested by Lee and Xiang [5] , that conditional entropy can be used to determine the best window size for probabilistic classifiers, and its implications for stide. This is followed by a brief exposition of a framework of sequence types, upon which a designed experiment is based, and offered in the next section. Experimental results are presented and discussed, to include the notion of different detectors being sensitive or blind to different phenomena. We then show how minimal foreign sequences can be found in the New Mexico data on which stide was originally run and we end by answering the questions posed in Section I.
III. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF STIDE
Stide acquires a model (or profile) of normal behavior by segmenting training data into fixed-length sequences [13] . This is done by sliding a detector window of length over the stream of training data. (Imagine a one-dimensional row of symbols, as on a Turing tape, and a short window sliding over the tape, through which only a limited section of the tape can be seen at one time.) Each length sequence obtained from the data stream is stored in a "normal database" of sequences of length . A similarity metric is then used to establish the degree of similarity between the test data and the model of normal behavior obtained in the previous step. Sequences of length are obtained from the test data using a sliding window, and for each length sequence, the similarity metric simply establishes whether that sequence exists or does not exist in the normal database. A length sequence from the test data that is found to exist in the normal database (where "existing" requires that a sequence be found in the normal database that is an identical match for the sequence obtained from the test data), is assigned the number 0. Sequences that do not exist in the normal database are assigned the number 1. The decision is binary; given a sequence from the test data, either there is an exact match in the normal database (0) or there is not (1) .
The detector's final response to the test data, termed the anomaly signal, involves a parameter known as the "locality frame." The (length of the) locality frame is a value determining the length of a temporally local region over which the number of mismatches is summed up. For example, if the locality frame is set to 20, then at each point of the test data the number of mismatches in the last 20 (overlapping) sequences, including the current sequence, is determined. The number of mismatches that occur within a locality frame is referred to as the locality-frame count (LFC). The LFC is the final value that is used to determine how anomalous the test data is. The length of the locality frame is a user-defined parameter that is independent of the length of the detector window used to segment the training and the test data.
IV. REPLICATING THE STIDE EXPERIMENTS
Hofmeyr et al. [4] , in a study of intrusion detection using sequences of system calls, noted explicitly that "the best sequence length to use would be six or slightly larger than six." Although a sequence length of six was used in earlier work (e.g., [2] ), it is in the Hofmeyr et al. paper that the significance of six as a sequence length was made most explicit. The number six was obtained empirically.
To verify that our own investigation was on solid ground, and to ensure that our own hypotheses could be validated using the original datasets employed in the Hofmeyr et al. study, we began by replicating their work. The similarity metric used in Hofmeyr et al. was based on Hamming distances; stide employs a different metric. We used both metrics on the same data set to show that the question of why a length-six sequence works best remains pertinent in both cases.
The data on which the experiment was run was obtained from the University of New Mexico web site [12] . The data were comprised of six separate data sets, each containing normal and intrusion data. The data sets were derived from several different system programs. Table I provides summary information about the data. For example, data set 6 is comprised of 1231 traces collected from running the lpr Unix printing program during normal usage of a production computer system (a trace, as defined by Warrender et al. [13] , is "a list of system calls issued by a single process from the beginning of its execution to the end"). There were 553 336 separate system calls in the collection of 1231 traces.
The results presented in Fig. 1 show the response of the detector that employed the Hamming-distance similarity measure. This graph shows only the curves associated with the two sunsendmailcp and three decode attacks, and mimics the graph of results presented in Hofmeyr et al. [4] . (The rest of the data are not shown, because they clutter the graph, and obscure its message; they are otherwise similar, however, in that they indicate anomalies at sequence lengths less than six.) We found in our results, as did the New Mexico team, that there was an absence of an anomaly signal for sequence lengths of less than six for the system calls corresponding to process identification number (PID) 283 in the file labeled sm-280.int (decode 1). 1 We see this phenomenon echoed in the results for stide (Fig. 2) , where the decode 1 intrusion was not detectable for sequence lengths of less than six, either. These results show that for both metrics, Hamming-distance and stide, a sequence length of six or greater was required to detect anomalies in all intrusive traces.
The graph in Fig. 1 , which differs slightly from the graph presented in Hofmeyr et al. [4, Fig. 2 ], plots the Hamming distance result for every sequence length from 2 to 20. The similarity between our graph and Hofmeyr's graph becomes apparent once the starred data points in Fig. 1 are removed. Despite slight differences in appearance, the essence of the two graphs is the same: namely that the first nonzero anomaly signal occurs at sequence length six for decode 1. The lowermost curve in Fig. 1 is for decode 1, the data set that will later be shown to be the source of the "Why six" question. The large bullets connected by the dotted line depict the curve from Hofmeyr et al. [4, Fig. 2 ].
V. WHY SIX, CONDITIONAL ENTROPY, AND STIDE Of the work that has addressed the issues of selecting appropriate sequence length, that of Lee and Xiang [5] comes closest to our own. They suggested that the conditional entropy of intrusion sequences could be a key factor contributing to the use of six-symbol sequences in the New Mexico sendmail data. They plotted conditional entropy of the UNM sendmail data against sequence length in [5, Fig. 1 ]. Their graph shows that as sequence length increases, conditional entropy decreases; in particular, there is a distinct knee in their entropy curve corresponding to a sequence length of seven. They said, "conditional entropy drops to very small values after sequence length reaches 6 or 7." They show that for probabilistically based classifiers, there is a relationship between the falloff in entropy and the appropriate window size for the classifier.
That conditional entropy could influence the selection of sequence lengths for stide seems like an appealing idea. Although Lee and Xiang [5] showed that conditional entropy may be useful for selecting appropriate sequence lengths for probabilistic classifiers, they did not attempt to extend the concept to stide. In this section, we will show that stide does not respond to changes in conditional entropy. We also offer an example suggesting that conditional entropy might not be a universal sequence-length selection metric, even for probabilistic classifiers.
A. Experiment: Conditional Entropy and Stide
To show that conditional entropy does not affect stide, we need to establish pairs of training and test data that differ only in terms of increasing irregularity (measured as conditional entropy) and nothing else. This means that the alphabet size, alphabet symbols, and sample size are all kept constant, while irregularity is calculated to increase at fixed and steady intervals. We used 11 streams of training and test data pairs [8] that comply with these requirements. The 11 unidimensional data sets corresponded to regularities (conditional relative entropies) that were equally spaced at intervals of 0.1, from 0 to 1 inclusive. The data pairs (training and test) were labeled 1 to 11, each pair differing from the preceding pair in terms of a measured increase in irregularity. The training and test-data pair labeled 1 were, therefore, the most regular, and the pair labeled 11 were the least regular, being composed of completely random data. The sample size of the training and test data was 1 000 000, and the alphabet size was chosen to be 8 arbitrarily. An alphabet size of 8 was chosen based mainly on computational constraints. The symbols for the data were drawn from the standard English alphabet (e.g., A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H for alphabet size 8) for simplicity's sake. (Maxion and Tan [8] performed the same experiment using different alphabet sizes and found that the response of the detector to the regularity difference was the same for all alphabet sizes.) 
B. Generating the Training Data
The training data were generated from eleven transition matrices designed to produce the desired regularities (conditional relative entropy) for the output sequences such that the regularity indices of the sequences run, in increments of 0.1, from 0 to 1 inclusive. Fig. 3 shows two examples of transition matrices used for sequence generation. The top matrix will produce a sequence whereby the next event at each point of the sequence is completely predictable, hence, a regularity index of 0.0. The bottom matrix illustrates the other extreme, producing a random sequence. The first column of a matrix denotes the input or the current symbol; the first row denotes the output given the input, or the next symbol given the current symbol.
A transition matrix is entered at a random point, determined by a random number generator. Once inside the transition matrix, each transition is determined by a random number between 0 and 1. To permit using any random number generator, particularly one that has been certified to be as random as the state of the art permits [7] , 1 000 000 random numbers (sample size) are computed first, stored in a table, and then used in determining the matrix transitions. In this way, the random-number sequence can be retained, if need be, to ensure perfect replication of the experimental sequence. The seed used for state transitions within each matrix is different from the one used to enter the table, simply to go as far as possible to eliminate dependencies in the generation scheme. A single seed (a four-digit random integer produced from the Perl function) is used to generate data for all regularities.
C. Generating the Test Data
Test data were generated in the same way in which the training data were generated, except that different random-number-generator seeds were used. Using new seeds for the test data guarantees that the generated sequences will retain the same intrinsic structure as seen in the training data, while ensuring that the specific order of symbols is not identical to that in the training data. The data-generation process does not introduce anomalous sequences or symbols into the test-data stream. The reason for this is because introducing obviously anomalous phenomena into the data stream would confound the results of the experiment; we would not know whether the detector was responding to the fluctuations in data regularity or to the presence of anomalous sequences. Anomalies were introduced in a separate process, described next.
D. Injected Anomalies
Into each of the 11 test data sets is injected a single anomaly consisting of a single symbol not present in the training data. This is the simplest unequivocally anomalous event that stide can be expected to detect. We inject only singleton anomalies, not clusters or groups of anomalies. A singleton anomaly consists of two consecutive mismatches as the anomalous symbol passes through the detector window, set to length 2 to be consistent with the data generator in which the probability of each element depended only on the value of the previous element in the sequence.
E. Stide's LFC
Stide's LFC, which serves as a filter or smoother, was not used, because smoothing plays no role in primary detection, i.e., the initial decision as to whether an anomaly (mismatch, in stide) has been detected or not. For stide, a hit occurs when a mismatch is registered. In the case of our test data, this will occur whenever the anomalous character is within the detector window. An anomaly or mismatch anywhere else will be regarded as a false alarm, whether it occurs in some temporally local region or not; consequently, smoothing is not needed.
F. Results for Conditional Entropy
The experimental results show that, given a situation in which everything was kept constant, including the type of anomalous phenomena introduced into the data streams, stide remained unaffected by the regularity increase from one data stream to the next, and continued to detect the anomalous symbol present in each of the 11 test-data streams. Stide achieved 100% hits and 0% false alarms, irrespective of the conditional entropy. These results appear sensible, because stide has no notion of probability, and will only be affected by probability if some probabilistic phenomenon introduces anomalous sequences into the test data. 2 If the data-generation process does not introduce anomalous sequences, the fluctuations in data regularity itself, 2 Other detectors can be affected by regularity; see [5] and [8] . in isolation, make no impact on the ability of stide to detect the anomalous symbol. If data regularity, measured as conditional entropy, does not affect the stide detector, then it is highly unlikely that this aspect of categorical data would be the determining factor for the appropriate sequence length that must be employed by stide.
G. Further Insight About Entropy
There remains a certain curiosity about the results of Lee and Xiang [5] . While they showed that entropy falls off as a function of sequence length, and furthermore demonstrated that this is so for the New Mexico data, we conducted a simple experiment which shows that the same kind of falloff can be seen even when the data are completely random (every alphabet symbol has an equiprobable chance of occurring at any point in the data stream). If the data are random, then it is difficult to imagine how any classifier could make sense of them. Hence, this calls into question whether or not conditional entropy can be used to establish window size, even for the probabilistically based classifiers discussed in [5] . This issue can be explored by experimental means.
For our simple experiment regarding Lee and Xiang's entropy, we created two streams of random data. One stream contained 100 000 elements; the other contained 500 000. Lee and Xiang [5] had used the New Mexico data sets, specifically the sendmail data (numbers in parentheses indicate sample size): bounce-1.int (293), bounce.int (818), sendmail.int, (19 526) queue.int (96 330), and plus.int (98 180). The largest of these contained about 98 000 elements; our sample size of 100 000 is simply rounded up from 98 000. Our sample size of 500 000 was arbitrary, solely for the purpose of having a very large data set to compare against. Our alphabet size of 53 was chosen because it was the largest alphabet size found in the UNM data. We used sequences sized 2 to 19, and calculated conditional entropy for each size, using the conditional-entropy formula provided in Lee and Xiang. Fig. 4 shows conditional entropy plotted against sequence length, using the random data. The figure illustrates the falloff at sequence-length six, where the curve drops to zero. The shape of the curve, with a knee at sequence-length six, strongly resembles the curves obtained by Lee and Xiang in their plot of the New Mexico data, yet this curve was produced with completely random data. Hence, conditional entropy may not be a suitable sequence-length selection metric, even for probabilistic detectors. A conclusive answer to this question awaits further investigation.
VI. FRAMEWORK: SEQUENCE TYPES AND HYPOTHESIS
The strength of the stide detection algorithm lies in its ability to detect foreign sequences-sequences not seen in its database of normal sequences. However, factors such as the relationship between the length of the sliding window and the length of the foreign sequence, as well as the effect of sliding a window over the foreign sequence, can make a significant impact on the detection capabilities of stide.
In order to describe these factors, we must first establish a framework within which such concepts can be expressed. Stide characterizes the normal behavior of a monitored process in terms of a database comprised of sequences of length . These sequences are obtained by sliding a window of this length along the trace (or traces) of system calls that have been obtained from the monitored process in the absence of intrusions. Stide only checks to see whether a test sequence is in the database or not. However, the frequency of the subsequences from which stide's normal-data sequences are composed is key to understanding why stide can be blind to certain sequences, as discussed further in Section VIII.
To inform that discussion, we must first provide some definitions. A rare sequence is one that occurs infrequently in the training data. We arbitrarily define as rare those sequences having a frequency of occurrence less than or equal to 0.5% in the normal traces. Common sequences are those sequences occurring more frequently than 0.5%. Foreign sequences are those that do not occur at all in trace(s) that were used to define normal behavior. Note that a sequence can be foreign by virtue of containing:
• one or more foreign symbols, i.e., symbols that are not contained in the alphabet set of the training data; or • a foreign order of symbols, i.e., a sequence in which each individual symbol within the sequence is a member of the training-set alphabet, but where the order of the symbols is one that does not exist (i.e., is foreign) in the set of sequences obtained from the training data; or • combinations of both. In this paper, we focus specifically on a special case of the foreign order of symbols, of which there are two forms. It is the second of these forms, indicated below, that is of importance here. A foreign order of symbols may exist as either:
1) a concatenation of sequences, at least one of which is a foreign sequence, where each of the constituent foreign sequences is smaller than the foreign sequence under scrutiny; or 2) as being foreign in its own right, i.e., containing no foreign sequence smaller than itself; it is, in its entirety, a foreign sequence. The second of these special cases is referred to as a minimal foreign sequence. The word minimal is used to indicate that the foreign sequence contains no foreign subsequence smaller than itself; all of its proper subsequences already exist in the normal trace(s). A minimal foreign sequence is the smallest possible foreign sequence such that it contains no smaller foreign subsequences.
We hypothesize that a detector-window length of at least six is required to detect all intrusive traces in the Hofmeyr data sets, and that this minimal foreign sequence of length 6 must have been composed of either rare or common subsequences. This would explain why neither stide nor the Hamming-distance detector detected this anomaly for detector-window lengths of less than six, i.e., because all the rare subsequences that make up the minimal foreign sequence of length 6 already exist in the training trace that comprised the normal database and, consequently, will not be seen by stide when using a window length less than six.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
In this section, we introduce the experimental regime for demonstrating the effect of minimal foreign sequences on the performance of two anomaly detectors: stide and a Markov-based detector. A detector based on Markov models [8] was used as a tool for comparison in order to help illustrate that factors affecting stide may or may not affect another detector employing a different approach; what constitutes an anomaly for one detector is not necessarily an anomaly for another. We will refer to the detector based on Markov models as the Markov detector. The Markov detector employs conditional probabilities, i.e., the probability of seeing an event, given the previous events, in its function as an anomaly detector. The Markov detector employed here is detailed in Section VII-A.
We showed in Section V that (ir)regularity in data, as measured by conditional entropy, does not affect the stide detection algorithm, nor can it be used to determine the appropriate detector-window length for stide. It is our hypothesis that the sizes of minimal foreign sequences in a given data set influence the appropriate detector-window size for stide. The following is an outline of the experimental procedure that we used to show this:
• generate training data;
• generate background test-data stream;
• construct and select minimal foreign sequences of lengths 2 to 9, composed of rare subsequences, from the training data; • inject the minimal foreign sequences, as anomalies, into the background test-data stream to create ground-truth test data; • run both anomaly detectors (stide and Markov) on the same training and ground-truth test data, while varying their detector-window lengths with respect to the length of the injected anomalous sequence; record results.
A. Description of Markov Detector
The Markov detector acquires its model of normal behavior by computing the transition probabilities between each fixedlength sequence of size , and the st element following that sequence. A transition probability is the probability that the st element of a sequence will follow the previous sizesequence. For example, given training data with an alphabet size of 2 (the element and the element ), and a detector window of size 2, , then the transition probability, , that the element immediately following the size-2 sequence "
" is " " can be computed as where • is the number of times that (or frequency with which) the sequence " " occurs in the training-data stream;
• is the number of times that (or frequency with which) the sequence " " occurs in the training-data stream. The model of normal behavior is acquired by sliding a detector window of size over the training data. Each size-(overlapping) sequence and the following st element obtained from the data stream are stored in a "normal database." A counter associated with each sizesequence is incremented to reflect the number of times that that sequence has occurred in the training data and a counter associated with each st element is incremented to reflect the number of times that that element has occurred after the previous sizesequence in the training data. Once the frequency counts for each sizesequence and st element have been calculated, the transition probabilities are then computed between each sizesequence and st element, and stored in the normal database.
In order to establish the degree of similarity between the test data and the model of normal behavior acquired by the detector, fixed-length (overlapping) sequences are obtained from the test data by sliding a detector window of size over the entire test-data stream. For every fixed-length sequence of size and the following st element obtained from the test data, the similarity metric performs a "lookup" operation that determines the probability that the st element in the test data follows the previous sizesequence. Recall that once the frequency counts for each sizesequence and st element have been calculated, the transition probabilities are then computed between each sizesequence and st element and stored in the normal database. Therefore, the "lookup" operation involves matching the sizesequence from the test data with the sequences in the normal database. If the test sequence is found in the normal database, and a transition probability is found in the normal database between the sizesequence and the st element from the test data, then that transition probability is assigned to the st element in the test data as a measure of how likely it is that that element followed the previous sizesequence. If the sizesequence is not found in the normal database, or if the st element is not found to follow the sizesequence in the normal database, then the st element in the test data is automatically assigned the value 0, i.e., a transition probability of 0. The result is a test-data stream in which each element, beginning at the st element, is assigned a value between 0 and 1 indicating the probability that that element followed the previous sizesequence.
The Markov detector's final response to the test data involves deducting the transition probabilities assigned to each element in the test data, beginning at the st element, from the value 1. The transition probability between a sequence and its following element is deducted from 1 only to ensure that 0 is the detector's response for normal events, and 1 is the mostanomalous detector response for abnormal events. The larger the value, the more unexpected or abnormal it is that a specific element follows the previous sizesequence. Although there are many other schemes that can be applied to the results of the similarity metric, the scheme described above was chosen to be examined in the present study because:
• it was the simplest in that it does not introduce complexities that would have obfuscated an analysis of a response based on raw transition probabilities; • it was consistent with the stide and t-stide detectors for which 1 is the most anomalous response from the detector, with 0 being the response to the most normal event.
Normal and abnormal events are distinguished by way of setting a detection threshold. If any of the Markov detector's responses reaches or exceeds the detection threshold, then an anomaly is signaled. The value of the threshold may range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most anomalous and 0 is the most normal. The lower the value of the threshold set, the more hits and false alarms register; the higher the value of the threshold, the fewer the number of hits and false alarms that register. Section VII-F provides details of how the threshold was set for the experiments described in this paper.
B. Generating the Training Data
The training data were constructed using a Markov-model transition matrix, consistent with the method described earlier in Section V-B and originally conceived in [8] . Although numbers were used to represent the elements of the training-data stream, the numbers were treated as categories. The methodology takes account of the fact that the test data need to contain common sequences, as explained below.
The transition matrix used to generate the training data had a conditional entropy value of 0.1. This means that at each point in the data stream, the next element is highly predictable given the current element, i.e., there is low uncertainty as to what the next element will be. Such a transition matrix was chosen simply because it generated data with the following desired characteristics:
• a large proportion of the data consists of a repetition of the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Ninety-eight percent of a one-million-element data stream, generated with this transition matrix, will consist of a repetition of the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. This results in a consistent set of obviously common sequences. These common sequences can be used later to construct test data in which there will appear no naturally-occurring rare or foreign sequences that might confound the response of the detector to an injected anomaly; • although a large portion of the data is repetitious, thereby producing a usable set of common sequences, there is a small amount of unpredictability in the probabilities that populate the matrix, ensuring the occurrence of the rare sequences necessary for selecting the rare subsequences that compose the minimal foreign sequence that will be later injected into the test data as an anomaly. The alphabet size for the training data was 8. We note that alphabet sizes in real-world data are certainly much higher than this; for example, there are about 243 unique kernel calls in Sun's Basic Security Module (BSM) audit data. However, our method aims to evaluate the capabilities of a detector in detecting the higher level concept of an anomaly. Although alphabet size may play a role with respect to certain aspects of the data, such as influencing the size of the set of possible foreign sequences or the size of the set of possible sequences that populate the normal database, a foreign sequence is still a foreign sequence regardless of the alphabet size, and the concept of a rare sequence will also remain immutable regardless of alphabet size. This abstraction allows us to study the response of the detector using synthetic data, as well as to apply the results from the synthetic environment to real-world environments.
The aforementioned matrix was used to generate a training-data stream of 1 000 000 elements. This sample size was an arbitrary choice, selected so that the data set would not be insufficiently small. There were two parameters that were chosen arbitrarily in this experiment: the sample size of 1 000 000 elements, and the length of the minimal foreign sequences ( ), which ranged from 2 to 9.
C. Generating Background Test Data
The background data for the test-data stream consisted of the most commonly occurring sequences only, which given the training data described above, contained only repetitions of the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. This ensured that only common sequences populated the background data. This was a desired property primarily because our aim was to observe the response of a detector to the specific minimal foreign sequence that we were intending to introduce into the background data in the second phase of this procedure. We, therefore, wanted background data that would not interfere with a detector's response by containing within it any obviously anomalous event that would constitute noise for a particular detector, for example naturally occurring rare or foreign sequences. To maintain consistency with the training data, the background test data was 1 000 000 elements long.
D. Characteristics of Injected Anomalies
We injected an anomaly that consists of a minimal foreign sequence of length , composed of rare subsequences (drawn from the training data, as explained in Section VII-B), into the test data stream. As noted above, a rare sequence is defined to be a sequence that occurs less than or equal to 0.5% of the time in the training data.
The decision to select rare sequences was prompted by the expectation that the Markov detector has the ability to detect rare sequences. When the length of the detector window is smaller than the lengthanomaly, we encounter the situation in which the detector does not "see" the entire minimal foreign sequence all at once. Instead, the detector is relegated to producing an anomaly signal based only on the smaller subsequences that form the larger minimal foreign sequence. In such situations, we would like to observe the effect of the rare subsequences on the performance of both a Markov-based detector and stide. Although we already know that stide does not have the ability to respond to rare sequences, we nevertheless apply the stide detector to an anomaly with these characteristics, primarily for the sake of charting and comparing the performance space of both detectors in an attempt to quantify how much more the ability to detect rare sequences actually confers upon the detection of foreign sequences under such circumstances.
E. Injecting Minimal Foreign Sequences
The minimal foreign sequences and their constituent subsequences must be chosen carefully so that the injection process itself does not introduce unintended perturbations in the background data. This is particularly significant with respect to sequence boundaries, i.e., where some elements of the injected anomalous sequence and some elements of the background data may combine within a detector's window to produce sequences that affect the anomaly detector in unintended ways. In particular, we need to avoid producing additional, undesired, foreign sequences due to the combination of symbols from the injected sequence and surrounding symbols from the trace.
Sequences composed by concatenating short, rare sequences from the training trace are likely to be foreign, simply due to the improbability that a substantial number of rare sequences would appear in the training trace in the chosen order. To provide a simple example, let be the anomaly size and be the size of the detector window. By sliding a window of size 2 over the training-data stream, a set of 999 999 size-2 sequences was obtained. Out of these sequences, all of the rare sequences were extracted; these seven rare sequences, each having a relative frequency of less than 0.5% in the training data by definition, are shown in Table II .
By combining these seven size-2 sequences, a foreign-sequence anomaly of size 8 can be constructed to be composed entirely of rare size-2 subsequences. One such example is the sequence 5 3 6 8 5 3 3 6. Each size-2 subsequence is a rare sequence drawn from Table II . This sequence can be injected into background data, creating an anomaly-in particular, a minimal foreign sequence anomaly-as shown in Fig. 5 .
Attention should be given to the regions bordering the injected anomaly, because unintended side effects sometimes arise at these boundaries. These regions are called boundary sequences-those sequences that contain at least one element of the background data and at least one element of the injected sequence-and are always the size of the detector window. Fig. 5 shows the two boundary sequences associated with an injected anomaly.
The injection process can sometimes produce, in the boundary sequences, spurious effects (e.g., foreign sequences) that are not part of the injected anomalous event itself. A boundary sequence that contains a foreign sequence may itself introduce an anomalous condition that would trigger an anomaly detector, and inappropriately cause a confounding of the detections of unintended boundary anomalies with detections of injected anomalies. To avoid this, the injection procedure must check to ensure that no spurious boundary anomalies are created as side effects of the injection. If a boundary anomaly is accidentally introduced, the injection is attempted elsewhere in the background data, or the anomaly is reconstituted, or both, until a fit is found. Notice in Fig. 5 that the boundary sequences are themselves rare sequences, as shown in Table II , and thereby introduce no unintended anomalies into the data stream.
The goal of the anomalous-event injection process is to introduce a minimal foreign sequence into the data without causing unwanted perturbations as contaminating side effects. Fig. 6 illustrates what can happen when injections are not properly controlled. The injection shown in Fig. 6 resulted in a mixture of foreign and rare boundary sequences where only rare sequences were wanted. These interposing foreign sequences, shown as black cells, constitute unwanted anomalies that will trigger a detector. When using stide as a detector, with a detector-window length of 5 and an injected anomaly of size 8 as shown, no anomaly should be detected as the detector window passes over the injection region. However, because the injection in this illustration did not control for spurious boundary sequences, five detections will occur-one for each row of five solid black cells. If the injection had controlled for spurious boundary conditions, the size-5 detector window would have seen the series of sequences shown in Fig. 7 where all the cells spanning the injection are gray, indicating rare sequences, and no anomalies would have been detected. Note that if the detector window's size were increased to 8, the size of the injected minimal foreign sequence, then there would be only a single detection-when the detector window exactly covers the anomaly-and this is precisely the intended effect.
The final suite of evaluation data contains one stream of training data and eight streams of test data, where each test-data stream contains a single minimal foreign sequence whose length is selected from the range 2-9. This set of nine data streams (one training, eight test) is then used repeatedly, once for each detector-window length of 2-15, resulting in a total of 112 test-data streams. Note that the length of the detector window is used to determine the length of the subsequences that compose each minimal foreign sequence.
F. Running the Detectors
We ran the stide and Markov based detectors on the suite of data created in the preceding sections. For each minimal foreign sequence being detected, we varied the length of the detector window from 2 to 15. It should be noted that for stide we ignored the locality frame count (LFC), focusing on the indication of a match (0) or a mismatch (1) .
Recall that the LFC functions as a noise smoother or signal enhancer by summing up the number of mismatches found within the span of the locality frame. Although the LFC does contribute to the final anomaly signal, it only comes into play after a match or mismatch has been detected. If the detection of a foreign sequence is missed, meaning that it does not register as a mismatch, then no amount of applying the LFC or adjusting its length will cause the missed sequence to be detected. Since applying the LFC function does not compensate for any underlying inability to perform detection, we reasoned that it could be ignored.
The outcomes of our experiments are expressed in terms of hits and misses, and in terms of regions of detection blindness and detection equivocality, or weakness. A hit is a correct detection; a miss occurs when the detector failed to detect an injected anomaly. When a detector window slides over an anomaly, e.g., a foreign sequence, at various points of its journey it will view sequences that are composed of a combination of the elements from the foreign sequence and elements from the background data. Under such circumstances, the interaction between the elements of the foreign sequence and the background data will cause sequence types to arise that prompt the anomaly detector to respond in one fashion or another. Regardless of how the detector responds, the response is still influenced by elements of the foreign sequence. Only when the detector window completely clears the entire foreign sequence (i.e., no elements within the detector window belong to the foreign sequence), can we say that the response of the detector is no longer influenced by the foreign sequence. In other words, as long as some part of the foreign sequence is within the span of the sliding detector window, it can be argued that the detector's response is due to the presence of the foreign sequence in the data. As a result, the response of the detector in such a circumstance should also be considered in the process of determining hits or misses. This line of reasoning resulted in the concept of the incident span that we use to determine hits and misses. The incident span (see Fig. 8 ) includes the elements of the background data adjacent to the anomalous sequence on one side of the detector window, the elements of the anomalous sequence, and the events of the background data adjacent to the anomalous sequence on the other side of the detector window. The length of this span is, therefore, elements. Alternatively, it can be said that sequences of length are contained within the incident span.
In a situation in which only a single minimal foreign sequence anomaly is introduced into each test stream, and in which the detector response may range along a continuum from 0 (indicating completely normal) to 1 (indicating maximal abnormality), we describe a detector as:
• blind, in the case where the detector response is zero for every sequence of the incident span; • equivocal, in the case where the maximum detector response registered in the incident span is greater than 0 and less than 1, indicating that something not unequivocally normal has been seen; • true, in the case where at least one detector response of 1 was registered in the incident span (the term "true" connotes veridical, unambiguous detection). Binary detectors, such as the sequence-matching portion of stide, are only capable of generating responses of 0 or 1. Other detectors, such as the Markov detector described in this paper, can generate equivocal, or weak responses. Equivocal responses can be converted to binary responses by applying a threshold that converts below-threshold responses to 0; others to 1. For the purposes of this work, the Markov detector was constrained by the aforementioned method to produce only a binary response, as does stide. In other words, the threshold for the Markov detector was set to 1 so that only maximally anomalous (minimal foreign) sequences are registered as hits. 3 
VIII. RESULTS
Figs. 9 and 10 show the results of the experiment described above. They map the detection capability of the stide and Markov detectors with respect to an injected minimal foreign sequence composed of rare sequences.
The axis marks the increasing length of the minimal foreign sequence injected into the test-data stream, and the axis charts the length of the detector window required to detect a minimal foreign sequence of a given length. Each star marks the length of the detector window required to detect a minimal foreign sequence whose corresponding length is marked on the axis, where the term "detect" specifically means that a maximum anomalous response occurred in the incident span. The areas that are absent of a star indicate that the detector was unable to detect the foreign sequence whose corresponding length is marked on the axis, where "unable to detect" means that the maximum anomalous response recorded along the entire incident span was 0, signifying completely normal.
Since the Markov detector is based on the Markov assumption, i.e., that the next state is dependent only upon the current state, the smallest window length possible is two. This means that the next expected, single, categorical element is dependent only on the current, single, categorical element. As a result, the axis marking the detector-window lengths in Fig. 9 begins at 2. Although it is possible to run stide using a detector window of length 1, doing so would produce results that do not include the sequential ordering of events, a property that comes into play with all the detector-window lengths that are larger than one. This, together with the fact that there is no equivalent on the side of the Markov detector, argued against running stide with a window of 1.
The axis also begins at 2. This is because the type of anomalous event upon which the detectors are being evaluated requires that a foreign sequence be composed of rare sequences. A foreign sequence of length 1, therefore, would contain a single element that must be both foreign and rare at the same time, and this is not possible. As a consequence, both Figs. 9 and 10 show an undefined region corresponding to a detector window and anomaly length of 1.
The results show that although the stide and Markov-based detectors both use the concept of a sliding window, and are both expected to be able to detect foreign sequences, their differing similarity metrics significantly affect their detection capabilities. There are three main points to note from the results. First, for stide, the detector-window length parameter must be greater than or equal to the length of the foreign sequence. The minimum length of the detector window required to detect each minimal foreign sequence is the size of the minimal foreign sequence itself. As can be seen from diagonal line in the results, the correlation between detector-window length and anomaly length is strong:
. Second, the results show that the similarity metric used by each detector significantly affects detection performance. In stide's case, even though we know that there is a foreign sequence present in the data stream, this foreign sequence is only visible if the length of the detector window is at least as large as the length of the foreign sequence. The similarity measure employed by stide appears to have a weakness in that it is unable to detect minimal foreign sequences composed of rare subsequences under conditions where . As a result, there are no guarantees that stide will detect events even if they do manifest as foreign sequences in the data. The Markov detector, on the other hand, appears to have no such weakness. The minimal foreign sequence in the data stream is visible to the Markov detector, even when the length of the detector window is smaller than the length of the minimal foreign sequence. This suggests that there are factors in this data stream favoring detectors that employ conditional probabilities. These factors, however, appear to have no effect on the sequence-matching approach employed by stide.
Finally, by charting the performance of stide and the Markov detector with respect to the detection of minimal foreign sequences, we are able to observe the nature of the gain achieved in detection performance between an algorithm that employs conditional probabilities and one that employs the sequencematching scheme used by stide. This gain in detection ability, due to the use of conditional probabilities, is significant and is illustrated by the blind region marked out in Fig. 10 .
These results provide evidence that shows a strong relationship between the length of the minimal foreign sequence and the length of the detector window required to detect such a phenomenon. It appears that the appropriate sequence length for stide is influenced by the length and composition of the minimal foreign sequences present in the data.
IX. MINIMAL FOREIGN SEQUENCES IN DATA
In Section IV, we saw that something about the decode 1 intrusive trace caused both stide and the Hamming-distance-based detector to completely miss the anomalies present in the decode 1 intrusive trace when detector-window lengths of less than six were employed. In experiments with synthetic data, we found that such behavior is typical of both detectors in the presence of minimal foreign sequences composed of rare or common subsequences. Here we tie these observations together, and propose that the solution to the "Why six" problem lies in the presence of a length-six minimal foreign sequence, composed of rare or common subsequences, in the decode 1 intrusive trace. Since no minimal foreign sequences exist in the decode 1 trace with lengths less than six, unlike all the other intrusive traces, no anomalies could be detected in the decode 1 trace when detector-window lengths of less than six were used. This meant that a detector-window length of six was necessary in order to detect anomalies in all intrusive traces, including decode 1.
Our task at this point is to identify the minimal foreign sequences that are present in the Hofmeyr data. We wish to elucidate characteristics, such as their constituent subsequences, and their various lengths. This serves several purposes:
• to show that the anomalous phenomenon (minimal foreign sequence) identified in this work actually exists in realworld data; • to show that regardless of the data, i.e., synthetic or realworld, when the performance of a detector has been established with respect to the anomaly types described in [9] , the performance results for a detector are immutable, and will persist reliably across data sets; • to verify that, in the case of stide, it is the presence of minimal foreign sequences in the data stream that dictates the appropriate detector-window length; • to solve the "Why six" problem. Table III lists the length and number of minimal foreign sequences present in intrusive traces decode 1, decode 2, sunsendmailcp and forwardingloops; these intrusive traces correspond to the synthetic sendmail (UNM) data set 1 of Table I . Due to space constraints, Table III does not include all of the data sets shown in Table I . Furthermore, results based on those data all show minimal foreign sequences of less than size six and would, hence, be redundant. The point we wish to emphasize is that decode 1 is the only intrusive trace that does not contain minimal foreign sequences of length less than six (see Table III ). This means that stide required a detector-window length of six in order to detect that single anomaly in decode 1, because there were no minimal foreign sequence anomalies of lengths less than six to detect in that intrusive trace. Upon further analysis of the single minimal foreign sequence in decode 1, we find that it is actually a minimal foreign sequence of length six, composed of rare subsequences. Its precise identification is:
Filename From the series of experiments described above, we have confirmed our hypothesis that a detector window with length at least six was required to detect anomalies in all intrusive traces used in [4] , because the length of the smallest minimal foreign sequence present in one of the intrusive traces was six. We found that the intrusive trace labeled decode 1 contained a single size-6 minimal foreign sequence, composed of rare subsequences. The rare subsequences meant that only when the detector window was large enough to see the entire minimal foreign sequence could that sequence register as an anomaly. We showed the effect of minimal foreign sequences, composed of rare subsequences, on stide's performance, and how their presence undermines the claim that stide will detect foreign or "unusual" sequences that occur in a stream of data. We have identified conditions under which stide is completely unable to detect the presence of foreign sequences in a data stream. Identifying minimal foreign sequences, and establishing their effect on stide, enabled us to provide a solution to the question of the "best" or most appropriate detector-window length to select in any application of the stide algorithm.
We have also shown that the performance characteristics established for stide on synthetic data remained stable across datasets. In this case, even when the detector was deployed on real-world data, we were able to explain its performance behavior using the lessons learnt for that detector on synthetic data.
Specific questions were raised in Section I about stide's reliance on the number 6 as a sequence length. We now conclude our exposition by answering those questions explicitly.
Why does a detector-window length of six appear to work, while lengths less than six do not?
Lengths less than six were not large enough to see the single minimal foreign sequence of size 6 in the decode 1 intrusive trace. That sequence was composed of subsequences that did not appear to stide to be anomalous, and so stide was unable to detect them. Note that if the data from decode 1 had been, for example, appended to the data from decode 2, then a window of length 2 would have sufficed for alarming on the intrusive behavior, because decode 2 contains minimal foreign sequences of length 2 (see Table III ). If the minimal foreign sequence in decode 1 had been larger than six, then stide's detector window would have had to be concomitantly larger to detect it, and in this case, stide's magic number would have been different.
Is a detector-window length of six appropriate for all data from differing environments?
A detector-window length of six is not necessarily appropriate for data from differing environments. Minimal foreign sequences, whose lengths have been shown to affect the selection of the appropriate detector-window length for stide, can be of any size. Stillerman et al. [10] , for example, found that a window length of two was sufficient to detect anomalies in all of their intrusive data. The magic number six, for stide, arose as an artifact of two circumstances: the selection of stide as a detector (blind to rare sequences), and the particular data sets studied in the Hofmeyr et al. [4] work (the presence of a size-six minimal foreign sequence in one data set). If decode 1 had not been part of the New Mexico data environment, six would not have been the magic number.
What is the impact on detection accuracy if an incorrect detector-window length is used?
The term "incorrect" can mean two different things. It can mean that the window length is too short to detect a minimal foreign sequence of a particular size. In this case, such a sequence would be misclassified as normal instead of anomalous, resulting in a missed detection and inaccuracy in the detection results. The severity of this would depend on how many misses were incurred and on how serious the missed attacks were.
"Incorrect" can also mean that the window length is too long; that it perhaps far exceeds the length of the longest minimal foreign sequence. The consequence of this would be that more computing power is required to run the detection apparatus, but detection accuracy would not be affected.
If not by "ad hoc means" [5] , how else can the "best" detector-window length be determined?
In regard to the work of Hofmeyr et al. [4] , the "best" detector-window length is that length which results in at least one anomaly being detected in each intrusive trace. For stide, an anomaly is a foreign sequence. The size of a particular type of foreign sequence, a minimal foreign sequence, directly determines the "best" detector-window length for stide.
For a given set of data, the best detector-window length would be the largest of the set of smallest minimal foreign sequences in each intrusive trace. For example, in Table III , there are 11 intrusive traces. The smallest minimal foreign sequence is length 2 in all of the intrusive traces except one. That exception was for decode 1, in which the size of the smallest minimal foreign sequence is six. The size-six minimal foreign sequence in decode 1 can be described as the largest of the set of smallest minimal foreign sequences obtained from each intrusive trace.
The best detector-window length is dependent on the size of the relevant foreign sequence. Foreign sequences are found only in test data (not training data -normal data has no foreign sequences), so it may not be possible, in stide's case, to determine the best detector-window length a priori based only on normal data.
As a final note, we remind the reader that we are assuming that the minimal foreign sequences we encountered in the real-world data actually are the manifestations of the intrusions of interest. We are currently not aware of any analysis that has established that the anomalies (minimal foreign sequences) present in the intrusive traces are directly attributable to the attacks that were deployed, rather than being due to some other event that occurred while data were being collected. This makes it hard to determine if the alarms raised upon detection of those minimal foreign sequences were hits or false alarms. It is possible that the single minimal foreign sequence of size six in the decode 1 trace was the result of insufficient training data.
These speculations raise a more general issue. To what extent can we establish a link between detectable anomalies and intrusive behaviors? How can we decide, a priori, what kind of a sensor stream is appropriate and what detector characteristics are likely to be well matched to the stream? For example, the decode 1 intrusion is characterized, in the UNM data, by exactly one minimal foreign sequence of length six. We have shown that stide, with a window size of less than six, cannot detect this particular incident. Are there intrusive scenarios that would produce minimal foreign sequences with greater lengths? In a similar vein, given knowledge of the detector and the working definition of normal, is it possible to modify an attack so that its trace appears to contain only normal sequences, or so that it contains only minimal foreign sequences of length greater than the size of the detector window? We are beginning to investigate these questions, and preliminary results [11] indicate that escaping detection in these ways is possible for stide-like detectors. We would like to extend these investigations to other anomaly-detection schemes.
In closing, we would like to acknowledge many people's observation that the stide algorithm is very simple. However, it is noteworthy that, despite its simplicity, its performance characteristics have been little understood, and it was not known how to set its parameters. Interestingly, systems more complex than stide have not exhibited substantial performance benefits over stide, concomitant with their complexity [13] . Hence, stide is worthy of study, particularly if what is learned will contribute to the knowledge of the more complex algorithms that are likely to be used in future intrusion-detection systems.
XI. CODA
Although we have presented a solution to the "Why six" question, the work described here goes beyond the particulars of that issue. It provides a methodical and rigorous approach to evaluating and characterizing anomaly-detection systems. It:
• enables a principled, not ad hoc, selection of detector operating parameters; • exposes detector weaknesses, thereby providing opportunities that benefit both offender (in cloaking attacks against detection [11] ) and defender (in improving the detector or in limiting its deployment to environments in which the weaknesses are immaterial); • shows the limits of a detector's capabilities, and supports corresponding claims with credible evidence; • maps quantitatively the regions of the anomaly space that are covered by the detector; • illustrates a rigorous methodology that can be extended to determine the operational effectiveness of other detectors. We repeat a remark from Lee and Xiang [5] , because it states our sentiments as well as we could state them ourselves. "Although one may argue that our results are simple, obvious and unsurprising, we feel that it is very important to develop a formal framework, even just for stating and validating the obvious, so that the field of intrusion detection can progress more rapidly and rigorously."
